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IMPLEMENTING CORPORATE VENTURING 
Birley, Manning and Norburn 
Corporate Venturing is not new. It has been around under a number 
of different guises and titles for many years. Indeed, in many 
respects, it was a common form of industrial development as early 
as the Nineteenth Century. In recent years, Peterson [1967] 
reported that DuPont had demonstrated a spotty record in internal 
corporate venturing for nearly two decades; in 1980, Brown 
reported that Seatrain had just completed 50 years of innovative 
operations; and in 1983 Business Week reported that "GE, Xerox, 
Exxon, Monsanto have been dabbling with venture investing for 
several years". What is new is the currency which it has recently 
achieved within large corporations as a way to harness 
entrepreneurial talent, to create windows into new technologies, 
and thus to develop new, growth businesses for the future. 
However, in almost all cases, the activity has fallen within the 
existing boundaries of the organisation, the investment being 
made either through a venture capital fund, or through a newly 
created, but wholly owned subsidiary. 
It was the contention of these authors in an earlier paper 
(Norburn, Manning, and Birley 1986) that the current high speed 
of environmental change mitigates against such constrained 
thinking; that large, mature, Twentieth Century organisations 
need to find new ways to respond to the technical and competitive 
challenges which they face. Further, we considered that 
entrepreneurial activity requires the organisation to think 
outside its existing boundaries to a menu of organisational 
relationships depicted in figure 1 (see also Minkes and Foxall 
1982, Hanan 1983) and that the traditional classification of 
firms into "large" and "small" was no longer appropriate. To 
quote Lessem (1982), we could be observing the "creative 
dis-integration of big business". We therefore take the view that 
corporate venturing is one technique amongst many, and, in any 
analysis, must be placed in the context of a total strategy for 
corporate regeneration. 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
This paper extends the argument presented in the previous paper 
to a discussion of the implementation of one element of strategic 
metamorphosis, corporate venturing in large corporations. It is 
based upon practical experience of working with both 
entrepreneurs, and small and large firms to create new ventures. 
Previous Literature 
Perhaps the most important point to make about the literature 
available is that it is almost entirely based upon American 
experiences. Since both entrepreneurial behaviour and management 
style are to some extent culturally bound, the lessons proposed 
must be treated with a certain amount of caution when applied in 
the European context. With this caveat in mind, a search of the 
literature exposes a number of issues. 
1. There is no consistency in the definition of the term. 
The activity can range through "venture management, 
innovation, new ventures, venturing, venture projects, venture 
activities, entrepreneurial ventures,", and the individuals 
involved have been variously called "venture groups, 
intrapreneurs, task forces, corporate centurions, corporate 
entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial management". Taking three 
British examples, Burrows (1982) defines venture management as 
a "corporate strategy for creating new products via new 
businesses, but also via internal growth". Fyfe (1985) 
describes a portfolio of approaches to corporate venturing 
adopted within ICI which includes venture capital investments, 
spin-outs, "garden shed" ventures, and "integrated" ventures. 
A recent publication from NED0 (1986) entitled "Corporate 
Venturing" defines the term unequivocably as "a partnership 
between large and small companies, the former known as the 
sponsor and the latter as the investee". However, in his 
review of the area MacMillan (1986) notes that the 
definitional problems are essentially those of scope, and in 
an earlier arcticle [MacMillan and George 19851, he attempts 
to clarify this by suggesting six levels of corporate 
ventures. This begins at the lowest level within new 
enhancements to current products/services ("not really 
venturing") - to the highest level "products/services concepts 
that do not exist today". We consider these rather wide 
definitions simply to reflect the extent to which a particular 
activity departs from the firms business base, an approach 
also adopted by Strebel (1984) and by Vesper (1984). 
2. There is almost no reference to why it is being attempted. 
Block (1982) notes that "ideally, the decision to venture is 
strategic". Despite this, the rationale for embarking on any 
form of venture activity is rarely discussed in the 
literature, although there is an implied assumption that it is 
aimed at sustaining profitability "to meet ambitious plans for 
growth and diversification" (Roberts 1980). Beyond this, there 
is an almost romantic zeal. Entrepreneurial activity is seen 
as exciting, a way to harness the energy of young executives, 
a good thing. Indeed, in her book The Change Masters, Kanter 
(1983) concludes that sooner or later all American 
corporations will be forced to develop innovative 
entrepreneurial structures in order to survive. 
3. There is little guidance as to when it should be adopted 
Most of the literature refers to the appropriateness of 
introducing general entrepreneurial activity into the firm 
rather than corporate venturing specifically. Thus Peterson 
and Berger (1971) concluded that entrepreneurship was an 
important component of leadership styles in diverse 
contemporary organisational contexts facing turbulent 
environments. In their study of the obstacles and effects of 
corporate venturing, MacMillan, Block and Subba Naraismha 
(1986) conclude that joint venturing is a seriously 
entertainable alternative "with fewer obstacles than grass 
roots startlups. It is only when an experience base has been 
built that joint venturing can be abandoned in favour of 
corporate start-ups". Conversely, Collier (1979) eschewed the 
traditional profit goal and proposed "Customer Oriented 
Corporations (Co-Corps)" which would concentrate upon customer 
service, product quality and price reduction rather than ever 
larger profits, and would therefore give "full opportunity for 
entrepreneurial ventures". Miller (1983) classified all firms 
into three types. Simple firms were those in which the focus 
for entrepreneurial activity rested with the leader or owner 
of the firm; in planning firms, he concluded that 
entrepreneurship was best stimulated by strategies which 
"ritualise and systematise innovation"; organic firms tended 
to be entrepreneurial according to the demands of their 
environments and the capacities of their structures. 
Indirect reference to the topic can be found in Gupta and 
Govindarajan (1984) who studied the general managers of 58 
strategic business units within eight Fortune 500 diversified 
firms. They found that the greater the marketing and sales 
experience, the greater both the willingness to take risks and 
the tolerance for ambiguity. Further, Sturdivant, Guiter and 
Sawyer (1985) found that managerial conservatism was 
negatively associated with both performance and social 
responsiveness. 
4. The mechanisms for finding potential new ventures are rarely 
discussed 
The most difficult part of the process of corporate venturing 
is the identification of appropriate ventures. Yet this is the 
area which is often completely ignored, apart from a few vague 
comments about the importance of strategic fit. For example, 
Lovdal (1984) notes that the "products, markets and 
technologies envisioned for a new venture must be rationalised 
in the context of the broader corporate portfolio." Indeed, he 
is very clear - "No matter how skillfully the venture is 
managed, a chemical company will have a difficult time opening 
a fast food chain". In their chapter on Conceiving New 
Business Opportunities, Burgelman and Sayles (1986) 
concentrate solely upon the Research and Development function, 
narrowing the role of new venture departments in large 
corporations to inovation; to seeking ways to integrate new 
technologies and potential markets. 
Turning to issues of implementation, most of the available 
literature concentrates upon the equally difficult issue of 
the choice of the venture management, about stimulating 
corporate entrepreneurs. For example, Carson (1982) reports 
that each year GE pick "a select number of high potential 
individuals and give each a product line which they are asked 
to run as a venture business". In Exxon, management and sales 
and marketing experience were found to be critical (Sykes 
1986). In discussing his corporate "intrapreneurs" Pinchot 
(1985) defines these as people who see "a problem whole - 
marketing, technology, finance, personnel". However, Lawler 
and Drexler (1981) note that whilst entrepreneurship is - 
possible in large organisations, the very nature of the 
organisational design and control systems can stifle the 
SUPPlY' a point reinforced by Molz (1984), and by Covin and 
Slevin (1986). 
5. Ownership is rarely viewed as a separate issue 
Despite a large amount of discussion about the need to find 
ways to motivate venture management to take risks, to manage 
failure, and to accept extended time horizons, this is rarely 
connected with the question of ownership of the new venture. 
Thus, few companies adopt the portfolio approach to ownership 
suggested by Norburn, Manning and Birley (1986), most prefer 
one, or at most two common mechanisms - a wholly owned 
subsidiary, or investment to an independent firm through a 
venture capital fund. Indeed, in his review of the literature, 
MacMillan (1986) comments that "researchers are unanimous that 
a high degree of autonomy be accorded to those charged with 
venturing" and subsequent discussion centres around the narrow 
question of a "separate venture business unit or not". In 
1973, Vesper and Holmdahl reported that 43% of the companies 
which they studied gave no special compensation to venture 
managers, 34% gave some cash bonus, and only 27% gave stock 
options. In 1986, MacMillan reports that "current work by 
Ornati and Block would seem to indicate that not much has 
changed in twelve years". .-? ' m.,. _A' 
6. Management in new ventures is widely discussed 
Most writers agree that whatever the scope of the corporate 
venturing activity, the management of the individuals involved 
is crucial to the eventual success of the venture. Moreover, 
this should involve the following key factors - 
* Separation from the rest of the organisation (Strebel 
1984, Burgleman 1985) 
* Freedom to make long term decisions (Roberts 1980) 
* Loose control systems (Hill and Hlavacek 1972) 
* Strong and clear support from senior management (Fast 
and Pratt 1981, MacMillan, Block and Subba Narasimha 
1986) 
7. Success is often (wrongly) assumed 
Despite the almost evangelical zeal with which many executives 
grasp at corporate venturing as a solution to current 
corporate economic decline, much of the evaluative data 
available suggests that few are successful. Hanan (1976) 
reported that many had failed; Dunn (1977) found that all had 
failed; Fast (1979) studied 18 new venture divisions 
established in the 1960s and found that a high proportion of 
them were short-lived; Sykes (1986) concluded that "internal 
ventures, though strategically important, did not provide 
Exxon with a profitable major new business diversification"; 
Geneen (1985) goes further, stating quite unequivocably that 
intrapreneurship does not work, that it is counter to the 
large organisational culture, a point echoed by Strebel 
(1984). In his survey of the literature, Burrows (1982) 
arrives at a depressing conclusion - "Although we have a great 
deal of evidence on the failure of venture groups we do not 
know the names of the companies or the type of product they 
attempted to develop. Thus, we are unable to make any 
conclusions on what type of product is suitable for new 
venture development or if, in fact, the failure was due to the 
method used in the development." 
CORPORATE VENTURING DEFINED 
From the literature described above it must be concluded that 
much of current corporate venturing practice is thought to be 
inadequate. This paper therefore provides a new approach. It 
draws upon the experiences gained through working with a number 
of large firms to create a variety of new venture opportunities, 
and builds upon our previous paper by focussing upon the issue of 
implementation. 
We define Corporate Venturing as the process of seeking, 
choosing, and managing any business opportunity which has 
potential for growth, but which is a departure from the company's 
core business, a NEW VENTURE. Whether this entails producing a 
different product, or serving a different market, it means 
managing an activity in which the firm may have no specific 
competence, and thus automatically involves additional risk. 
Frequently it is small relative to the core business with a 
protracted timescale for development, often as long as ten to 
fifteen years (see Biggadike 1979). 
THE IMPACT ON SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
We endorse the view proposed by Seed (1985) that the ultimate 
criterion for any strategic choice is the impact of the strategy 
upon the value of the company to its shareholders as reflected in 
the share price. Clearly, since this includes any decision to 
embark upon corporate venturing, it is central to our argument 
and mandates definition. 
A company's share price is assumed to be a measure of the 
expectation of its future earnings stream. Thus, Seed expresses 
the share price as a function of - 
D/K + PVG + PRV 
where; 
D = Cash dividends paid per share 
K = Cost of equity 
PVG = Perceived present value of growth in future cash 
flows during the term of the investment (dividends 
plus capital gains) 
However, simply discounting the expected net cash flows by the 
cost of capital would seriously underestimate the value of the 
company, which can be expected to earn profits beyond the 
forecast period. Therefore - 
PRV = Perceived present residual value of investment at the 
end of the term of investment. 
The residual value will be high for a company which the market 
considers to have sustainable long term growth prospects beyond 
the period of investment, and low for companies such as public 
utilities which are demand led, and so unlikely to outperform the 
market as a whole. 
Shareholder Value, as reflected in the company's share price, can 
therefore be affected by choosing strategies which either lead to 
increases in the forecast net cash flows and/or the residual 
value and/or to decreases in the cost of capital. Moreover, the 
share price will reflect these strategies only to the extent to 
which they are communicated to, and accepted by, the market. 
Taking this approach, the impact of new ventures upon shareholder 
value will be a function of the incremental changes in the net 
flows, residual value and cost of capital. Thus, for successful 
new ventures, the negative impact upon initial cash flows should 
be offset by an upgrading of the longer term prospects for the 
firm as reflected in the residual value. This positive impact 
will, however, be tempered by any adjustments to the cost of 
capital as a result of the markets perception of the additional 
risk. 
From this analysis, it is clear that new ventures should be small 
in size relative to the firm as a whole, but have potential for 
substantial growth relative to those forecast for the core 
business areas. New venture strategies are, therefore, most 
appropriate for those large firms which have a stable base but 
with little potential for improved performance in the long term. 
We classify this type of company as the "Sleeper", wishing to 
change its rating to that of "High Flyer" (See Figure 2). From 
this, it is clear that corporate venturing is not appropritae for 
any firm with a high residual value already rated as a High Flyer 
since it would add further risk to the portfolio. 
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
TYPES OF NEW VENTURES 
This paper adopts the view originally encapsulated by Ansoff 
(1965) and developed by Block (1982) that risk is inversely 
related to knowledge of the market place. Since it is the 
customer who decides the eventual fate of any strategy, those 
projects which are close to the existing customer base will carry 
a lower risk than those which seek to move into entirely new 
markets. Therefore, new ventures can be classified into three 
groups; 
Group A: Customer Related Ventures 
- serve the same customer base as the core business. They 
involve either selling new products or services, or extending 
the added value chain serving existing customers. 
The risk for these ventures is relatively low since not only 
do they capitalise upon existing links with customers, but the 
firm is also likely to possess the relevant managerial skills. 
Group B: Resource Related Ventures 
- exploit existing corporate resources such as plant, 
buildings, debt structure, people or buying power. 
Whilst these ventures may, at first, seem relatively 
attractive to those firms with underutilised resources, the 
costs of entering new markets can often be substantially 
higher than the apparent cash investment. 
Group C: Unrelated New Ventures 
- draw upon none of the existing skills or resources. 
From the above argument, it follows that one portion of the risk 
associated with any new venture is associated with the nature of 
the venture in relation to the existing skills and resources of 
the business. This is illustrated in figure 3 below. 
Insert Figure 3 About Here 
Thus, in this rubric - 
Box A: Low management skill, low market knowledge, 
unrelated venture 
HIGH RISK 
Box B: High management skill, high market knowledge, 
customer related 
LOW RISK 
FINDING NEW VENTURES 
Despite the impression gained from the literature we consider the 
windows through which to identify potential new ventures to be 
opaque y it being rare that a firm is able to identify a steady 
stream of reasonable propositions from which to choose. Thus, we 
consider that the stimulation of venture ideas should be part of 
the continuing strategic process. Moreover, opportunities may 
arise from three sources - 
1. Analysis of current activities, customers, suppliers and 
resources - Customer related ventures. 
2. Analysis of the firm's activity flows, the combination of 
tasks and resources which convert inputs into products and 
services - Resource related ventures. 
3. The establishment of links with third party conduits for 
new ventures, such as financial institutions, Universities, 
and other intermediary organisations. 
Essentially, this requires a proactive approach whereby senior 
management constantly seeks new ideas, and, more importantly, 
communicate this to both the internal and the external 
environment. It is based upon the premise that having established 
the process, individual opportunities may emerge in any of three 
ways - 
* Ventures created by the firm 
* Ventures found by the firm 
* Ventures which sought out the firm 
ASSESSING NEW VENTURE OPPORTUNITIES 
Despite the deliberate nature of the process outlined above, in 
the event, particular opportunities will arise over an extended 
period of time and in an unpredictable fashion. Therefore, it is 
often impossible to assess their attractiveness against others 
available at the time. Nevertheless, it is important for managers 
to have some view as to the general shape of the portfolio if the 
new businesses are to be the base from which future core 
businesses are developed. We have found the following 
classifications to be useful in focussing strategic direction. 
1. Themes - As the corporate venturing activity gathers 
momentum, themes based upon markets, skills or technologies 
should emerge. Whilst not related directly to the current 
core business, they form the basis for a critical mass of 
new skills and knowledge. 
2. Catalysts - Businesses which draw upon apparently unrelated 
skills and resources within the firm. 
3. Wild Cards 
Moreover, we propose that, in choosing particular ventures, the 
following criteria should always apply: 
1. Size: the venture needs to be potentially large enough to 
have an impact on the residual value of the firm. 
2. Investment: the nature and size of the investment should 
not affect the share price negatively. Thus, any adverse 
affect upon the forecast cash flows should be more than 
compensated for by an increase in the residual value. 
3. Share Price: For the new venture to be capable of affecting 
the share price in the future, it must satisfy one of two 
conditions; 
a. Disposal - be capable of sale, thus realising a 
"one-off" profit. 
b. Integration - be in a position for the earnings to be 
consolidated. 
THE NEW VENTURES DIVISION 
Much of the literature described in the earlier part of this 
paper assumes that any corporate venturing strategy will be 
managed by a separate divsion within the firm - the "New Ventures 
Division" (See Burgleman and Sayles 1986, MacMillan 1986). We 
consider this to be an important factor since the task of 
developing a new ventures programme is specialised, complex, and 
difficult and best undertaken by a specialist management group. 
However, it is often unclear where the management of any new 
venture created should lie. We consider that a new ventures 
division should be the focal point for all new venture activity, 
but that its role should vary according to the nature of each 
activity chosen. Moreover, its role should not be to manage 
individual ventures, but rather 
- to identify, evaluate, and assess opportunities by developing a 
network of contacts both internally and externally. 
- to propose and implement appropriate venture structures. 
- to monitor and report on the performance of each activity. 
CHOOSING AN APPROPRIATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Untimately, the choice of a management strategy is linked with 
the nature of the ownership of the new venture. In an earlier 
article (Norburn, Manning and Birley 1986) the authors argued 
that in any large organisation, a gap tends to develop between 
the dominant corporate culture and any innovative activity, and 
that doubt must exist as to whether a bias towards innovative 
entrepreneurship is possible within a structure whose 
transformation is constrained generically, and whose 
characteristics are mechanistic or bureaucratic. We therefore 
proposed that corporations in mature industries should consider a 
wider range of relationships which transcend traditional 
corporate boundaries, adding a third dimension, that of 
ownership, to the strategy/structure relationship. This network 
of loose couplings affords an opportunity for choosing an 
ownership structure for new ventures which better fits the level 
of skills and knowledge depicted in figure 1. Thus, for example - 
* Box 1 - a subsidiary provides a high level of both 
ownership and control but with the holding company 
effectively taking all the risk of the new venture. 
Structured in this way, the venture can easily be 
integrated into the core business at some future 
date. 
* Box 2 - a franchise structure draws upon the 
company's marketing strengths but devolves 
operational management. 
- renting out assets by means of, for 
example, concessions retains ownership of the 
essential asset, but devolves responsibility for 
managing the business. 
- joint ventures afford an opportunity to 
reduce the risks associated with limited managerial 
and market skills whilst at the same time retaining 
significant ownership of the business. 
* Box 3 - new ventures which are eventually found not 
to fit the corporate strategy, either because the 
market potential is found to be smaller than 
originally anticipated, or because the demand on 
resources is too high, can be spun off or sold to the 
management, remaining in the portfolio of the firm as 
minority investments. 
* Box 4 - increasingly, firms are being drawn into 
projects which have a limited life, whether this be 
the making of a film, the running of a major event 
such as the Olympic Games, or participating in a new 
fund. These new ventures are characterised by a need 
for the collaboration of a number of very different 
skills for the period of its duration, after which 
the "business" ceases to exist. 
MANAGING NEW VENTURES 
There are six key issues associated with managing new venture 
programmes - 
1. Scale; Most new ventures are small, either in absolute 
terms, or relative to the core business. Operating at a 
reduced scale can be difficult and unattractive to managers 
who have been used to the prestige and structured framework 
of a bigger business. 
2. Decision-making; Whilst the initial investment costs of a 
new venture can be relatively small, the decision is a 
strategic one, and so should be taken at the highest level 
in the organisation. Moreover, both the level of 
uncertainty, the availability of information, and the 
timescales involved make it inappropriate to use the same 
decision rules that would apply elsewhere in the firm. 
3. Resources; New ventures cannot be "drip-fed" money. They 
require periodic tranches of financial support which are, 
for most purposes, irrevocably committed. 
4. Planning and Control; For a new venture faced with high 
levels of uncertainty and a distant visions of the future, 
planning cannot be time based. Short-term actions have to 
be taken, outside previous plans but within pre-defined 
milestones, which would include, for example, completion of 
product development work, completion of test-marketing, or 
the delivery of the first production model. 
5. Integrating; New ventures can become isolated from the rest 
of the company by virtue of different management styles, 
markets and operations. As a result, the venture may fail 
to benefit from relevant and useful skills available 
elsewhere in the company. 
6. Learning; Companies get better at venturing the more they 
do. The learning process should not, however, be confined 
to those managers directly concerned with new ventures. The 
commitment and understanding of the whole organisation is 
needed and will be more easily gained if there is a general 
awareness of the challenge and potential benefits of new 
ventures. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL MANAGERS 
The management of a new venture, whatever the ownership 
structure, requires an entrepreneurial approach to cope with the 
special problems of developing an uncertain, and often risky 
venture. There are five key tenets which must be adopted when 
assessing the performance of new venture managers. 
1. Uncertainty; By comparison with an established business, a 
new venture is faced with very different types of 
uncertainty. For example, both market, technological and 
operational procedures will be in a constant state of flux. 
Moreover, they will be operating with incomplete 
information, and will be forced to change direction rapidly 
and comparatively often. 
2. Timescales; It is clear from both the research evidence 
available, as well as from the practical experience of fund 
managers that new ventures take a long time to come to 
fruition. For example, Biggadike (1979) found that, on 
average, profitability was not achieved before the seventh 
year, and that an acceptable return on investment was not 
reached until the tenth year. 
3. Cash Rules; For these ventures, the management of cash is a 
dominant concern. The initial cash investment represents 
the total resource for reaching its first milestone. 
4. Managerial Structure; In the face of uncertainty, and the 
need for rapid change, new ventures need broadly based 
organic structures with ill-defined boundaries between 
functions. Consequently, the management will tend to come 
from multi-disciplinary backgrounds and be happy working in 
an informal atmosphere. 
5. Gaining Commitment; This latter point is reinforced by the 
fact that there is considerable evidence that a new 
ventures activity will fail without a strong, and clearly 
evident commitment at the highest level in the 
organisation. 
Thus it is clear that those executives involved with new ventures 
must demonstrate intrinsic attributes of hunger, determination, 
faith and energy, and that companies should recognise their value 
to the organisation as a whole by encouraging their atypicality. 
CAVEATS TO CORPORATE VENTURING 
The major theme of this paper is that corporate venturing must 
have a clearly defined shape and strategy. Decisiions must ba 
made upon the amount of money and effort to be invested, general 
portfolio characteristics, with clear objectives and realstic 
[long] timescales. Beyond this, our experience highlights four 
areas of particular difficulty which constrain anticipated 
success - 
* Tinkering with the new ventures division's objectives, 
constantly changing the targets and investment criteria, 
making consistent decision making very difficult. 
* Giving the new ventures division too much independence leading 
to insensitivity to the overall needs of the company and 
potentially to isolation and separation. 
* Pressurising the ventures to grow too rapidly to demonstrate 
viability and results at the expense of building a stronger 
and better business more slowly. 
* Prematurely absorbing the venture into the company or 
disposing of it, either as a result of apparent success or 
apparent failure, before the full potential has been realised. 
Corporate Venturing should not be considered a 'quick fix' for 
those companies experienceing current competitive disadvantage. 
The path towards its implementation is difficult and 
time-consuming. We believe the steps outlined in this paper - 
definition, sourcing, assessing, structuring, managing, and 
staffing - should improve the likelihood of a successful 
metamorphosis. 
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